The problem of allocation in coalitional games with noisy observations and dynamic 4 environments is considered. The evolution of the excess is modelled by a stochastic differential 5 inclusion involving both deterministic and stochastic uncertainties. The main contribution is a 6 set of linear matrix inequality conditions which guarantee that the distance of any solution of the 7 stochastic differential inclusions from a predefined target set is second-moment bounded. As a direct 8 consequence of the above result we derive stronger conditions still in the form of linear matrix 9
In order to overcome the problem of an empty core in (Shapley and Shubik, 1966) 118 the notion of -core was introduced 119 Definition 2.4. For a real number the -core is defined as:
In order to assess stability of the grand coalition, the core, both its value η N , and 120 the reward allocated to each player is needed. Therefore, there is a need to define 121 an allocation mechanism of the coalition's rewards among the players. One of the 122 most used allocation mechanisms is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953 (Shapley, , 1971 ). An 123 additional reason for choosing Shapley's value is its connection with feedback control 124 and uncertainty as it was shown in (Bauso and Timmer, 2012) 125 Definition 2.5. The Shapley value of player i, given a coalitional game < N, η > is defined as:
The Shapley value can be interpreted as the expected weighted contribution of 126 player i when it joins the grand coalition in a random order. (Shapley and Shubic, 1969) , 129 public good games (Bodwin, 2017) , the bankruptcy problem (Aumann and Maschler, 130 1985) and inventory problems (Chinchuluun et al., 2008) . Applications which com-131 bine TU games with optimisation and learning include micro-grid problems (Saad et 132 al. , 2013) and coordinated replenishment (Bauso and Timmer, 2009 ). 133 The case study which is considered in this article, the intelligent mobility network 134 application, falls in the category of the inventory problems. Players should decide if 135 it is more beneficial to create a coalition and share the cost of the inventory or it is 136 better to bear the cost alone.
137
Intelligent mobility deals with the smart transport of items, goods or individuals 138 from source to destination nodes using shared facilities like buses, trams, electric 139 vehicles. Suppose that items are initially stored in the supply centre indexed by 0 140 and need to be transported to different destination centres generically indexed by i, 141 i = 1, . . . , n. Destination centres are characterized by a time-varying demand which 142 is independent identically distributed across time and centres.
143
Note here that the capacitate vehicle routing problem is usually solved in two 144 parts. In the first one the assignment problem is solved, i.e. one makes decisions 145 about the sites that should be visited. In the second part the optimal route is found 146 through traveller salesman algorithms for example. In this article we focus on the 147 first part, where the network topology is not playing a significant role. The manager 148 of destination center i bids the quantity to be transported from the supply center When all managers act jointly, we say that they form a grand coalition. In such 156 case a single cycle will touch all destination centres as described by the transport 
159
In stable environments, in cases where the cost function of players is deterministic, 160 and it possible to obtain observations without noise the conventional analysis of TU 161 games can be applied, i.e. results about the existence of the core, or the evaluation 162 of nucleus or Shapley's value.
163
In particular, consider the scenario where N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of receiving centres. For each coalition S ∈ S, let D S be a random variable representing the aggregate demand faced by that coalition. Let us assume that D S has continuous probability density function f (D S ). In other words, the probability that the aggregate demand is between a and b is
The continuous cumulative distribution function (CDF) is F (b), and represents the probability that the aggregate demand is less than or equal to b:
Let Θ be the order quantity, p in R + be the sale price, s in R + be the penalty 164 price for shortage, when demand exceeds supply, and let h in R + be the penalty price 165 for holding, when supply exceeds demand.
166
Introduce the stock variable Z S = Θ − D S . Denote the indicator function by 167 (1)
Then, the expected profit for the generic coalition S ∈ S under the order quantity 169 Θ is given by
In the above we express the expected profit as function of the expected shortage and 172 expected holding, which are given by
174
We can then rewrite the expected profit as
The following relation between the expected shortage E s and the expected holding 177 E h holds:
where y s is the mean demand and is given by
by the coalition is the one of maximizing the expected profit with respect to the order 181 quantity Θ, which is the decision variable:
Assuming concavity of P S (D S , Θ) the optimal order quantity Θ * is obtained by 184 computing the derivative of P S (D S , Θ) with respect to Θ and taking it equal to 185 zero. To do this, after rearranging the first term E min(Θ, D S ) in the above equation
we can rewrite the expected profit as 190 This manuscript is for review purposes only.
Then for the derivative we have
where F is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of y. The optimal order 193 quantity is given by: 195 Let F −1 be the inverse function of F then it holds 197 Then, the optimal expected profit is 198 (7) 199 where we denote by E * h the expected surplus under the optimal order quantity Θ * S .
200
Consider a sequence of sampling intervals indexed by k = 0, 1, . . .. We build on 201 the results for the optimal order quantity (6) and expected profit (7), which we have 202 obtained above. We assume that the demand at interval k has a Normal distribution 203 with mean D S (k − 1) and variance σ 2 :
205
We can rewrite the optimal order quantity in terms of the number of standard deviations away from the mean:
where k has standard Normal distribution. Denote by Φ(k) the CDF of a standard Normal distribution, from (5) we have
To obtain (6) from (5), we introduced the inverse function F −1 . We follow the same procedure here and consider the inverse function Φ −1 of Φ. Then, for the optimal k * it holds
Denote the expected surplus of k as
Then, from (7) the optimal expected profit is
207
Note that the expected profit decreases with the standard deviation σ, namely, the 208 volatility of the demand.
209
Coalition games that are subject to probabilistic demand/ characteristic function, 210 as in the aforementioned example, have been also studied in the context of stochastic 211 cooperative games (Suijs et al., 1997; Toriello and Nelson, 2017) . In that context In the current article a different approach is adopted. The control of the stochastic 217 process in order to be bounded around the core is considered, instead of trying to 218 define suitable conditions for the core of the game to be non-empty. As a result a 219 formulation of TU games with dynamically changing characteristic function, which 220 allows its representation as a stochastic process is provided. A saturated controller is 221 used in order for the process to be bounded around the core. The proposed controller 222 resembles the "Best response" decision making process. Hence, stochastic differential 223 inclusions emerge from the control process. Therefore, analysis of a stochastic process 224 which can be occured through the TU game formulation is provided, based on the 225 theory of stochastic differential inclusions Benaim et al. (2005) . 226 Since the cost function is not constant throughout the game any more and in each 227 time step of the decision making process a fluctuated version of the cost function is 228 available because either of changes in the environment or noisy observations. This 229 analysis focuses on the control of the outcome of the stochastic process either to be 230 in the core or bounded in the -core based on the volatility of the perturbations. This manuscript is for review purposes only.
It possible to represent a dynamic TU game in Matrix form. In addition, fol-247 lowing the dynamic programming paradigm, all the constraints which arise from 248 the definition of the core can be represented as inequalities. In particular, let B H 249 be a ((q − 1) × n)-matrix whose rows are the characteristic vectors y Sj ∈ R n of 250 each coalition other than the grand coalition, i.e., S j ∈ S, S j = N . In other words
The characteristic vectors are in turn binary vectors representing the participation 253 or not of a player i in the coalition S j , whereby y
For any allocation in the core of the game C(η(t)) we have: where the inequality is to be interpreted component-wise, and for the grand coalition 258 it is satisfied with equality due to the efficiency condition of the core, i.e,
Inequality (9) can be rewritten as an equality by using an augmented allocation 264 vector given by u :
variables. Then, we have 266 (11) Bu(t) = η(t).
267
For a 3-player coalitional game equation (11) takes the form
Remark Note here that in general TU coalitional games, as well as the formulation 268 which is proposed in this article, suffer from the curse of dimensionality. In particular, 269 the dimensionality of B will exponentially increase with the number of players and TU games which follows in the rest of this article is based on the assumption that the 280 perturbations are bounded in an ellipsoid, i.e w(t) can be written as:
The changes in the characteristic function as they are realised by the players can be 283 written then as
where ΣdB(t) is a random noise with zero mean and Σ = diag((Σ ii ) i=1,...,q ) ∈ R q×q 286 for given scalars Σ ii , all full column rank, and B(t) ∈ R q is a q-dimensional Brownian 287 motion, which is independent across its components, independent of the initial state 288 η 0 , and independent across time.
289
Instead of studying the evolution of the characteristic function in order to solve a TU game the surpluses s j can be studied. Note that the difference between the allocated value and the coalitional S j , corresponds to surplus variable s j and is described as,
A positive value for s j (t) can be interpreted as a debit for the coalition, whereas Let us denote the controler in linear state feedback form as:
Then the problem of stabilising the core can be cast as a problem of solving the 303 following stochastic differential inclusion:
for assigned polytopic sets co{K (i) } i∈I , and ellipsoidal set W, and where B(t) is a 308 Brownian motion weighted by a matrix Σ and B defined as in (10).
309
The stability, well-posedness and existence of solution to (15), when saturated 
315
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5.
Examples. The stochastic differential inclusion (15) 
where u + , u − are assigned vectors. Note that we can assume the characteristic func-322 tion centred at zero as in (12) as we can always center the hypercube of u(t) around 323 any desired value.
324
In addition, for any matrix K ∈ R n+(q−1)×q , define as saturated linear state 325 feedback control any policy
where ∂U indicates the frontier of set U.
328
In the above, the sat{.} operator has to be interpreted component-wise, namely
where K i• denotes the ith row of K and where, for any given scalar a and b sat [a,b] 
Henceforth we omit the indices of the sat function. problem where there is a demand for a specific commodity and the reward for sup-336 plying it is suitably described by our control law. When the demands are based on a 337 diffusion process, their evolution can be written as:
339
Then (13) can be written with respect toḋ as:
The excess then can be written as
where u is the control vector as defined in (18). (15) 
Example 3: approachability. Equation

345
In particular (15), can be obtained when a 2-player repeated game with vector payoffs as displayed in Table 1 , is considered. Let A 1 = {u (1) , . . . , u (p) } and A 1 = {w (1) , . . . , w (q) } be the actions sets of player 1 and 2. Denote a 1 = [a 11 , . . . , a 1p ] T and a 2 = [a 21 , . . . , a 2q ] T the mixed strategies of player 1 and 2, respectively. Introduce the mixed extension mapping ∆ 
If we rescale the time window using s = e t , take x(t) = Γ(e t ) and differentiate with respect to t, we obtain the differential equation (15). Note that, after rescaling the time window, we have
Adopting a "population-game dynamics" perspective, the state x(t) ∈ R q repre-348 sents the current average payoff over the population. Our idea is to rewrite the above dynamics in the following polytopic form
where the time varying matrices K(x, t) are expressed as convex combinations of 360 |I| matrices K (i) , i ∈ I. More precisely the expressions for K(x, t) are 361 (23)
The control policy is then
In the case of saturated controls the procedure to derive the weights in the above 363 control policy are discussed in (Gomes da Silva, 2001) .
364
Theorem 6.1. The distance of any solution of the stochastic differential inclu-
where Ψ (i) = [BK (i) − I] and X j is any subspace where K (i) is in the support S j of K, i.e., the control is
Proof. The analysis is then performed within the framework of stochastic stability 368 theory (Loparo and Feng, 1996) . To this end, consider the infinitesimal generator EV (x(t + dt)) − V (x(t)) dt 
The last inequality is obtained from observing that (27) can be rewritten as
Trivially it must hold β ≤ α. Assume without loss of generality that β = α − 385 q i=1 Σ 2 ii P ii . 1 Recall that α and β can be chosen arbitrarily. After pre and post-386 multiplying by Q = P −1 , the above condition becomes
Now, as the state never leaves the region S(ψ θ ), i.e., x(t) ∈ S(ψ θ ), we can always 389 express A(x(t)) as a convex combination of the A j s as in (23).
390
By convexity, the above condition is true if it holds, for all j = 1, . . . , 2 n ,
Using the Shur complement condition (28) is implied 393 by (24).
394
Based on the above stated theorem we can infer that the solution of a dynamic TU 395 game when (15) is used will lie in the -core. This is because even if the disturbance 396 in 13 is a q-dimensional unbounded Brownian motion, the dynamics of the process 397 are bounded in the second moment.
398
Stronger conditions are established in the following corollary.
399
Corollary 6.2. The distance of any solution of the stochastic differential inclu-400 sion (15) from the target set Π is second-moment bounded, if there exists a scalar 401 α ≥ 0 such that, for all
Proof. Straightforward from observing that (29) implies (24).
404
Note that conditions (24) simply impose that each one of the conditions (29) (for 405 fixed j) holds only in a specific region of the state space and not over the entire R n .
406
In this sense, condition (24) is weaker than (29).
407
Let d(x, Π) be the distance of any given x ∈ R q from the target set Π. Consider 408 a modified stochastic differential inclusion 
Proof. The underlying idea is that for all x ∈ Π, and w ∈ W 419 (32)
We then look for α, β ≥ 0, such that for all (x, w) ∈ Π × W 421 (33)
which is equivalent to setting β ≤ α and solving
424
After pre and post-multiplying by Q = P −1 , and using convexity, the above condition 425 leads to (28), and this concludes the proof.
426
Let B(t) be a zero-mean random noise such that dB(t) has bounded support. 
Recall thatW := {ω : ω = w +σ, w ∈ W,σ ∈ [−Σ, Σ]}. From the above we have 437 that for all x ∈ Π it must hold
For all x ∈ Π, and ω ∈W the above condition holds if there exist α, β ≥ 0, such that
From the definition ofR it holds
condition (38) can be rewritten as
x ω ≤ 0. Initially the deterministic version of dynamics (15) is decomposed as
wherew(t) is an uncertain but bounded deviation from the expected profit, given by Before we calculate δ j and δ j , note that to derive (40), we simply write the real 456 profit as combination of expected profit w 0 (t) and deviation from the expected profit 457w (t), namely w(t) = w 0 (t) +w(t). The expected profit is a priori known and given 458 by w 0 (t) = [ P S (D S , Θ * S ) ] S∈S .We can then design a first control input u 0 (t) based 459 This manuscript is for review purposes only.
on the Shapley allocation to compensate the optimal expected profit. To do this, let 460 u 0 (t) be obtained from the following equation:
462
To obtain an expression for δ j let us maximize the profit of the corresponding 463 coalition S with respect to y, namely
Then, the maximal profit for coalition S is
Substituting the above in (42), we have
Similarly, to obtain δ j used in (43), let us minimize the profit of the corresponding 466 coalition S with respect to y, namely
The above means that the minimal profit is obtained when the power output is zero, which leads to min y P S (y, Θ * S ) = P S (D S , Θ * S ) = P S (0, Θ * S ) = pµ − (s + c)Θ * S .
Substituting the above in (43), we have
We can conclude that
As last step we define the parametrized ellipsoid
where Φ is a matrix in R m×m and consider the problem of finding the smallest ellipsoid Π k which contains W (2) :
The dynamic model we obtain is then
which is of the same form as in (15). 
483
The dynamic demand of such system can be defined as the diffusion process of 484 (20) and the excess is defined as in (21). In the simulations of this section a saturated 485 controller of the form of (18) is used here K = kB −1 and k = 2 3 . In our simulations 486 we consider the case of four players/energy producers that should decide if they will 487 be part of a coalition and share the costs and profits from energy production. The the simulations will be considered.
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This manuscript is for review purposes only. Fig. 2 . Evolution of excess. The combined dotted and dashed lines depict the coalitions with a single member, the dotted lines depict the coalitions with two members, the dashed lines depict the coalitions with three members and the solid line depicts the grand coalition. 
